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Finite size analysis of measurement device independent
quantum cryptography with continuous variables
Panagiotis Papanastasiou, Carlo Ottaviani, and Stefano Pirandola
Computer Science and York Centre for Quantum Technologies,
University of York, York YO10 5GH, United Kingdom
We study the impact of finite-size effects on the key rate of continuous-variable (CV) measurement-
device-independent (MDI) quantum key distribution (QKD), considering two-mode Gaussian at-
tacks. Inspired by the parameter estimation technique developed in [Ruppert et al. Phys. Rev. A
90, 062310 (2014)] we adapt it to study CV-MDI-QKD and, assuming realistic experimental condi-
tions, we analyze the impact of finite-size effects on the key rate. We find that the performance of
the protocol approaches the ideal one increasing the block-size and, most importantly, that blocks
between 106 and 109 data points may provide key rates ∼ 10−2 bit/use over metropolitan distances.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1] promises to allow
unconditionally secure (theoretical) communication. Its
strength relies on two main elements: The encoding of
classical information (0 and 1 bits) into non-orthogonal
quantum states, and the impossibility of perfect discrim-
ination between them. In a conventional QKD protocol
two users, Alice and Bob, share quantum systems which
are unavoidably corrupted every time that an eaves-
dropper (Eve) tries to access the information encoded.
This perturbation is detectable, and allows the parties to
quantify the amount of error-correction and privacy am-
plification to apply to the shared data, in order to reduce
Eve’s information to a negligible amount. Then they can
use the obtained key in an one-time pad protocol [2].
The fundamental mechanism of QKD is clearly pre-
served also in more complex (repeater-based) communi-
cation configurations [3, 4], aiming at activating long dis-
tance communication and quantum networks. In the ba-
sic point-to-point scenario, the recent work [7] succeeded
in establishing the secret-key capacity of various quan-
tum channels. The combined use of relative entropy of
entanglement [8–10] and teleportation stretching (which
reduces any adaptive protocol to a block-form) enables
one to compute the two-way capacity of many important
quantum channels (see Ref. [7] and further works [11–15]
for the correct definition and rigorous use of teleportation
stretching in quantum communication, quantum metrol-
ogy and channel discrimination). The result of Ref. [7]
sets the fundamental limit of point-to-point QKD and, as
such, it marks the edge when private communication in-
evitably needs quantum repeaters. This benchmark has
already had a wide application in recent works [16–29].
Continuous variable (CV) quantum systems [30], in
particular Gaussian systems [31], emerged recently as
very promising carriers of quantum information. They
have the potential to be used for high-rate quantum
communication because, rather than using single-photon
quantum states and photon-counting, they employ bright
coherent states and homodyne detections, which nat-
urally boost the achievable key-rate. Based on this
premise, CV QKD protocols [32] have been proposed
using one-way [33–35] or two-way quantum communica-
tions [36]. Some one-way schemes have been experimen-
tally realized [37–40], over remarkably long-distance [41,
42]. Additional theoretical analysis has been focused on
QKD with thermal states [43–48], with an experiment
performed [49]. Recently CV-QKD has been extended
to a network configuration [50, 52], implementing the
general idea of measurement-device-independent (MDI)
QKD [53, 54]. Here two parties, unable to access a se-
cure direct link, can be assisted by an intermediate relay
(even untrusted) to establish a secure channel.
Many challenges [55] need to be solved, before private
quantum networking can become a mature technology.
However, CV QKD protocols and their security analysis
have progressed rapidly toward more practical and real-
istic assumptions. In this respect, the incorporation of
finite-size effects is particularly important. In fact, when
we assume that the parties exchange only a finite num-
ber of signals, one expects the deterioration of the key
rate. In addition to this, finite-size analysis is also the
first step towards a more general security proof within
the composable framework [56–58]. While the theoret-
ical study of the impact of finite-size effects has been
done in several previous works [59–61], CV-MDI QKD
has been so far investigated neglecting this aspect and
limiting the analysis to the asymptotic regime [62].
In order to start filling this gap, in this work we focus
on evaluating the impact of finite-size effects on the key-
rate of CV-MDI protocol. This study is important not
only because these effects have not yet evaluated in detail
for MDI protocols, but also because this type of analysis
represents a necessary steps to refine the security anal-
ysis of CV-MDI towards the more complete composable
scenario. We perform a detailed study of the impact of
finite-size effects for both the symmetric [52] and asym-
metric configuration [50, 51]. We extend the parameter
estimation methods described in Ref. [61], for conven-
tional one-way protocols, to the relay-based communica-
tion. We consider Gaussian two-mode attacks which have
been already extensively studied in one-way schemes [63],
two-way protocols [64, 65] and the CV-MDI setup [66].
We remark that, in our analysis, we work within the
Gaussian assumption. This allows us to develop the sta-
2tistical estimation theory of the relevant parameters of
the channels which are their transmissivities and excess
noise. The confidence interval of the estimated parame-
ters are then quantified using their variances and setting
a 6.5−sigma accuracy, which allows us to grant a very low
error probability of ǫPE = 10
−10 during the parameter
estimation procedure. The confidence intervals are used
to select the worst-case scenario, by choosing the lower
transmissivity of the links and the higher excess-noise
available. The key rate is then numerically computed,
using the estimated values of transmissivity and noise,
and optimized over free parameters, which are the Gaus-
sian modulation of the signals and the ratio between the
number of signals used in the parameter estimation and
total number of signals exchanged.
As expected we find that, increasing the block-size
of the signals exchanged, one recovers the performance
under ideal condition. Most importantly, one has that
block-size in the range of 106÷ 109 signals can provide a
positive key rate of about 10−2 bit/use, in the presence
of high excess noise ε = 0.01, and attenuation compatible
with the use of standard optical fibres over metropolitan
distances. The structure of this paper is the following. In
Section II, we present the details of the CV-MDI-QKD
protocol. In Section III, we describe the parameter es-
timation. In Section IV, we discuss the results obtained
and finally Section V is for the conclusions.
II. PROTOCOL, EAVESDROPPING AND KEY
RATE
For the sake of clarity, let us first describe the work-
ing mechanism of CV-MDI-QKD from the prepare and
measure perspective, where Alice and Bob send coherent
states, |α〉 and |β〉, to an intermediate relay. The ampli-
tudes α and β are Gaussian modulated, i.e., each party
sends to the relay an average thermal state with variance
VM ≥ 0. The duty of the relay is very simple: it mixes
the incoming signals on a balanced beam splitter and
performs a CV Bell detection, i.e., two conjugate homo-
dyne detections on q− and p+, at the output ports of the
balanced beam splitter [67]. Then, the relay broadcasts
the obtained values of γ := (q− + ip+) /
√
2. This new
variable can also be written as γ := α− β∗ + δˆ, where δˆ
is the detection noise. It is then clear that the relay acts
as a correlator for the parties, who can infer each other
variable (α, β) from a simple post-processing [50].
The broadcast of the Bell detection outcomes, γ, does
not help the eavesdropper who is forced to attack the
communication links to the relay, in order to obtain in-
formation on amplitudes α and β. This operation intro-
duces detectable excess of noise, that the parties can use
to quantify Eve’s knowledge on α and β (accessible infor-
mation). From this stage on, the protocol works as any
other QKD scheme [1], with the Alice and Bob imple-
menting enough error correction and privacy amplifica-
tion to reduce Eve’s accessible information to a negligible
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FIG. 1: The figure shows the EB representation of CV-MDI
QKD. Alice and Bob have TMSV states with modes (a,A)
and (b,B). Local modes a and b are kept by the parties, while
A and B are sent to the relay through two links with transmit-
tance τA and τB . When Alice and Bob heterodyne the local
modes, the travelling ones A and B are projected onto coher-
ent states |α〉 and |β〉. The relay performs a Bell-measurement
and broadcast the outcomes γ, creating correlation between
the parties: for instance, Bob recovers Alice variable β by
subtracting his variable α from the relay’s outputs γ. The
Gaussian attack on the links is simulated by Eve using an-
cillas E1 and E2, and thermal noise ωA ≥ 1 and ωB ≥ 1,
respectively. These ancillary modes are, in general, two-mode
correlated (see text for more details). The ancillary outputs
are stored in a quantum memory for a later measurement.
amount.
A. Two-mode eavesdropping
A powerful approach to study the security of any quan-
tum cryptographic protocol is to adopt the entanglement
based (EB) representation, where the description of the
dynamics takes place in a dilated Hilbert space, which
allows to work with pure states. The EB representa-
tion of CV-MDI QKD scheme is given in Fig. 1: Alice’s
and Bob’s sources of coherent states are purified assum-
ing to start from a two-mode squeezed vacuum (TMSV)
states ρaA and ρbB , whose zero-mean Gaussian states
are completely described by the following identical co-
variance matrices (CM)
VaA = VbB =
(
µI
√
µ2 − 1Z√
µ2 − 1Z µI
)
, (1)
where µ = VM + 1 and Z =diag(1,−1).
Modes A and B are sent through the links, while lo-
cal ones, a and b, are heterodyned. The measurements
projects the travelling modes into coherent states |α〉 and
|β〉 respectively. The channel attenuation on modes A
and B is modeled by two beam splitters with transmis-
sivities τA and τB , with 0 ≤ τA,B ≤ 1. These process
Alice’s and Bob’s signals with a pair of Eve’s ancillary
systems E1 and E2 which, in general, belong to a wider
reservoir of modes controlled by the eavesdropper and
including the set e (which can be neglected in the limit
of infinite signals exchanged [68]).
3We can then write the dilation of the initial Eve’s state
as a two-mode Gaussian state σE1E2 described by the
following general CM
VE1E2 =
(
ωAI G
G ωBI
)
, (2)
where G =diag(g, g′). The correlation parameters g
and g′ satisfy the constraints given in Ref. [72], while
ωA, ωB ≥ 1 account for the thermal noise injected by Eve,
on each link, during the attack. When g = g′ = 0, the
two-mode state σE1E2 is a tensor product, which leads
to a standard single-mode collective attack realized by
two independent entangling cloners [38]. By contrast for
g 6= 0 and g′ 6= 0, the two entangling cloners are not in-
dependent, and the optimal attack is two-mode coherent,
as described in [50, 52, 66].
B. Key rate
The EB representation is useful for the security analy-
sis because Alice-Bob reduced output states ρab|γ and
ρb|γα, described by the CMs Vab|γ and Vb|γα respec-
tively (see Section A for further details), have the same
entropies of Eve’s output states. Under the ideal as-
sumption that the parties exchange infinite many signals
(N ≫ 1), and assuming that the parties reconcile over
Alice’s data to build the key, one bounds Eve’s accessible
information by the Holevo function,
IH := S(ρab|γ)− S(ρb|γα), (3)
where S(.) is the von Neumann entropy. For Gaussian
states, we have the simple expression [31]
S =
∑
x
h(x),
where x is the generic symplectic eigenvalue of the CM,
and
h(x) =
x+ 1
2
log2
x+ 1
2
− x− 1
2
log2
x− 1
2
, (4)
x→∞→ log2
e
2
x. (5)
We then can write an expression for the key rate
K∞ := ξIAB − IH , (6)
where ξ ≤ 1 quantifies the inefficiency of error correction
and privacy amplification protocols [69–71] and IAB is
Alice-Bob mutual information. This is given by
IAB =
1
2
log2
V q
b|γ + 1
V q
b|γα + 1
+
1
2
log2
V p
b|γ + 1
V p
b|γα + 1
, (7)
with V q
b|γ (V
p
b|γ) and V
q
b|γα (V
p
b|γα) being the variances
of CMs Vab|γ and Vb|γα for the position (momentum)
quadrature. These CMs are given in Appendix A. The
key rate is then function of parameters ξ, ωA, ωB, τA and
τB and the Gaussian modulation VM . Its expression can
be found in the supplemental information of Ref. [50].
III. CHANNEL PARAMETER ESTIMATION
In a practical implementation of any QKD protocol,
Alice and Bob can only exchange a finite number of sig-
nals. In addition, they can only use a portion of these
to build the key, being the others used to estimate the
channel parameters. In this section we provide a de-
scription of CV-MDI QKD, quantifying the impact of
finite-size effects and the performance of the protocol. To
perform this analysis, we adapt the theory developed in
Ref. [61] for one-way CV-QKD. We determine the chan-
nel parameters (transmissivity and excess noise) within
confidence intervals. Then we choose the worst case sce-
nario, picking the lower transmissivity and higher excess
noise within their confidence intervals, so as to minimize
the key rate.
A. Losses and excess noise at the relay outputs
The outputs variables of the relay are quadratures q−,
relative to mode −, and p+ for mode +. These depend
on the evolution of Alice’s and Bob’s travelling modes
A = (qA, pA) and B = (qB , pB). In terms of these
input field quadratures one can then write the following
relations
q− =
1√
2
(
√
τBqB −√τAqA) + qN , (8)
p+ =
1√
2
(
√
τBpB +
√
τApA) + pN , (9)
where qN = qε + qsn and pN = qε + qsn are noise terms
accounting for both excess noise and quantum shot noise
coming form the signal modes as well as Eve’s ancillary
modes. Their variances are given by
VqN = 1 + Vq,ǫ, VpN = 1 + Vp,ǫ, (10)
with
Vq,ǫ = k − gu, Vp,ǫ = k + g′u, (11)
and
k =
(1− τB)(ωB − 1) + (1− τA)(ωA − 1)
2
, (12)
u =
√
(1− τB)(1 − τA), (13)
where g and g′ have been defined in Eq. (2).
Now we describe in more detail the parameters estima-
tion procedure. Alice’s and Bob’s Gaussian modulation
VM is assumed to be a known parameter. We need to es-
timate the channel’s transmissivity τA, τB and variance
of the excess noises Vq,ǫ and Vp,ǫ, with their confidence
intervals. Assuming that m Gaussian distributed signals
are used for this task, we associate to Aq,i (Ap,i) and
Bq,i (Bp,i), for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}, the empirical realiza-
tions of the field quadrature of the traveling modes. By
4contrast, we denote by Rq,i and Rp,i the realizations of
the relay outputs. Let first discuss the dynamics of the
quadrature q. From Eq. (8) one can write the estimator
of transmissivity τA as follows
τˆAq =
2
V 2M
Cˆ2ARq ,
where the covariance CARq =
√
τA/2VM has maximum
likelihood estimator given by
CˆARq =
1
m
m∑
i=1
Aq,iRq,i,
and to which one can associate the following variance (see
Appendix C for more details)
Var(τˆAq) =
8τA
m
(
τA +
τB
2
)[
1 +
Vq,N(
τA +
τB
2
)
VM
]
. (14)
Very similar relations hold for the estimator of τA ob-
tained considering the other output of the relay, p+. We
can write the estimator of the covariance CARp , which is
given by
CˆARp =
1
m
m∑
i=1
Ap,iRp,i,
then using Eq. (9) one can write the estimator of the
transmissivity τA
τˆAp =
2
V 2M
Cˆ2ARp ,
having variance
Var(τˆAp) =
8
m
τA
(
τA +
τB
2
)[
1 +
Vp,N(
τA +
τB
2
)
VM
]
.
(15)
We notice that it differs from the formula of Eq. (14)
for the expression of Vp,N , given in Eq. (10). Now, from
Eq. (14) and Eq. (15) we calculate the optimum linear
combination of the variances of the two estimators
Var(τˆA) =
Var(τˆAq )Var(τˆAp)
Var(τˆAq ) + Var(τˆAp)
:= σ2A. (16)
The same steps can be performed to obtain the relevant
estimators for transmissivity τB and the corresponding
variance Var(τˆB) = σ
2
B .
Now we write the estimator of the variance of the ex-
cess noise present on the communication links, Vq,ǫ. This
can be derived from the maximum likelihood estimator
for Vq,N , and it reads
Vˆq,ǫ =
1
m
m∑
i=1
[
Rq,i − 1√
2
(
√
τˆBBq,i −
√
τˆAAq,i)
]2
− 1,
(17)
with variance (Appendix C)
Var(Vˆq,ǫ) ≈ 2
m
V 2q,N := s
2
q. (18)
Correspondingly, we obtain an estimator for Vp,ǫ ex-
pressed as
Vˆp,ǫ =
1
m
∑
i=1
[
Rp,i − 1√
2
(
√
τˆBBp,i +
√
τˆAAp,i)
]2
− 1
(19)
and variance
Var(Vˆp,ǫ) ≈ 2
m
V 2p,N := s
2
p. (20)
Finally, from Eq. (17) and Eq. (20) we compute the con-
fidence intervals and select the pessimistic values given
by the following choice of parameters
τ lowA =τA − 6.5σA, τ lowB = τB − 6.5σB, (21)
V upq,ǫ =Vq,ǫ + 6.5sq, V
up
p,ǫ = Vp,ǫ + 6.5sp. (22)
B. Secret key rate with finite size effects
Once we have obtained the estimation of the transmis-
sivities of the links and the corresponding excess noises,
we can write the key rate, incorporating finite size effects
writing
K =
n
N¯
(
K∞(ξ, VM , τ lowA , τ
low
B , V
up
q,ǫ , V
up
p,ǫ )−∆(n)
)
,
(23)
where n = N¯−m is the number of signals used to prepare
the key and N¯ the total number of signal exchanged. The
key rate is then computed replacing the values of Eq. (21)
and Eq. (22) in the asymptotic key rate of Eq. (6). In
particular, first one computes the key rate R of Eq. (23),
using the Holevo function of Eq. (3) for the channel pa-
rameters given by Eq. (21) and (22). Then, in order
to account for the penalty for using the Holevo function
even if we have a finite number of signals exchanged, one
must include the correction term
∆(n) ∼
√
1
n
log2 2ε
−1
PA
which depends on the number of signals used to prepare
the key, n, and the probability of error related to the pri-
vacy amplification procedure εPA. A detailed description
of this correction term can be found in Ref. [60].
IV. RESULTS
The key rate of the asymmetric configuration of
the relay is described in the top-panel (a) of Fig. 2.
We plot the key rate as a function of Bob’s chan-
nel transmissivity, expressed in terms of dB of atten-
uation, while the transmissivity of Alice’s link is set
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FIG. 2: (Color online)The figure summarize the impact of fi-
nite size effects on the performance of CV-MDI QKD for both
asymmetric (panel a) and symmetric (panel b) configuration
of the relay, in the presence of optimal two-mode attack. In
panel (a) the key rate is plotted as a function of the dB of at-
tenuation on Bob’s channel, with the relay placed near Alice
τA = 0.98. From top to bottom, the black curves describe:
the rate for N¯ ≫ 1 with ξ = 0.98, and optimizing over VM
(solid line). Then we have the cases with finite block-size.
The dashed line is for N¯ = 109 while the dot-dashed curve is
obtained for N¯ = 106. In all cases we have assumed excess
of noise ε = 0.01 SNU. The red curves (*) describe the case
obtained for pure loss and assuming ξ = 1, VM →∞, N¯ →∞
(solid line) and N¯ = 109 (dashed line). Panel (b) focuses on
the symmetric configuration of the relay. The curves are ob-
tained using the same parameters as in panel (a), but setting
τA = τB = τ .
to τA = 0.98. The curves are obtained considering
two-mode optimal attacks, for which g = −g′ with
g = min
[√
(ωA − 1)(ωB + 1),
√
(ωB − 1)(ωA + 1))
]
and
ωA ∼ ωB ∼ 1.01 [50] and using the key rate of Eq. (23)
incorporating also finite-size effects. The efficiency of
classical code for error correction and reconciliation ef-
ficiency is set to ξ = 0.98, and the final key rate is opti-
mized over the variance of the Gaussian modulation VM
(see Fig. 3) and the ratio r = n/N¯ . The black-solid line
gives the asymptotic key rate for very large N¯ (>> 109),
while the dashed line is for block-size N¯ = 109 and the
dot-dashed line is obtained for N¯ = 106.
The bottom panel in Fig. 2 (b), plots the secret key rate
for the symmetric case [52] (τA = τB). The curves are
obtained setting all the other parameters as in Fig. 2 (a)
and optimizing as before the key rate for the case includ-
ing finite-size effects. The black solid line describes again
the asymptotic case N¯ →∞ of the symmetric configura-
tion while the dashed lines is obtained for N¯ = 109 and
the dotted one for N¯ = 106.
Let us finally remark on a couple of points. First,
we notice that the performance of finite-size CV-MDI-
QKD converges to the ideal one if the number of signal
exchanged increases. Second, according to the plots, we
notice that the key rate of the CV-MDI-QKD protocol is
sufficiently robust with respect to the finite size effects,
with block sizes of 109 points approaching the asymptotic
limit.
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we have studied the security of Gaus-
sian CV-MDI-QKD taking into account finite-size effects.
These emerge when one assumes that the parties ex-
change only a finite number of signals during the quan-
tum communication stage. In our analysis we assumed
imperfect efficiency of error correction and privacy am-
plification (ξ < 1) and developed the finite-size analysis
adapting the channel parameters estimation approach de-
scribed in Ref. [61]. The resulting finite size key rate has
then been optimized over the Gaussian modulation and
the number of signals used to perform the parameter es-
timation.
Our results show that, also considering finite-size ef-
fects under realistic conditions, CV-MDI QKD over
metropolitan distances is feasible within today state-of-
the-art experimental conditions. In particular, we found
that the adoption of block-size in the range N¯ = 106÷109
is already sufficient in order to achieve a high key rate
of 10−2 bits/use over metropolitan distances, and in the
presence of an excess of noise ε = 0.01 (SNU).
Finally we underline that the present analysis does not
put a final word on the performances of finite-size CV-
MDI-QKD. The validity of the described analysis is in
fact restricted to the case of Gaussian attacks. Further
studies are needed where finite-size effects are investi-
gated within the composable security framework. See
Ref. [73] for a fully composable security proof of CV-
MDI-QKD.
Note added. Shortly after the submission of our
manuscript, an independent work [74] has been posted
on the arXiv. Also this work studies the impact of finite-
size blocks on the key-rate of CV-MDI QKD.
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FIG. 3: This figure shows the impact of the reconciliation
efficiency on the key-rate. When ξ = 0.95 (dashed line), the
Gaussian modulation maximizing the key rate is VM < ∞ .
While when ξ = 1 then the optimal key rate is obtained for
VM → ∞ (solid line). The lines are obtained for pure loss
attack, τA = 0.98 and τB = 0.7 and block size N¯ = 10
6.
Appendix A: covariance matrices and symplectic
eigenvalues
For the sake of clarity, in this section we re-write the
CMs and the relevant symplectic eigenvalues derived in
Ref. [50] using the notation adopted in the main text.
The CM describing the total output state of Alice and
Bob, after the relay measurements, ρab|γ , is given by the
following expression
Vab|γ =
(
(VM + 1)I 0
0 (VM + 1)I
)
− VM (VM + 2)×
×

τA
ϕ
0 −
√
τAτB
ϕ
0
0 τA
ϕ′
0
√
τAτB
ϕ′
−
√
τAτB
ϕ
0 τB
ϕ
0
0
√
τAτB
ϕ′
0 τB
ϕ′
 , (A1)
where
ϕ = (τA + τB)VM + 2 + 2Vǫ,g, (A2)
ϕ′ = (τA + τB)VM + 2 + 2Vǫ,g′ (A3)
and where we have defined
Vǫ,g =
1
2
(
τ¯B(ωB − 1) + τ¯A(ωA − 1)− 2g
√
τ¯B τ¯A
)
, (A4)
Vǫ,g′ =
1
2
(
τ¯B(ωB − 1) + τ¯A(ωA − 1) + 2g′
√
τ¯B τ¯A
)
,
(A5)
with τ¯l = 1− τl, for l = A,B.
Bob’s output CM after the double conditioning, first
with respect the relay measurements and then after Al-
ice’s heterodyne detection, Vab|γ , is given by
Vb|γα =
( 2(VM+1)(1+Vǫ,g)−τBVM
2(1+Vǫ,g)+τBVM
0
0
2(VM+1)(1+Vǫ,g′ )−τBVM
2(1+Vǫ,g′ )+τBVM
.
)
which has the following symplectic eigenvalue given by
the
√
. of the determinant of previous matrix
ν¯ =
√
detVb|γα. (A6)
Appendix B: Useful elements of estimation theory
According to the method of maximum likelihood es-
timation, for a bivariate normal distribution X =
(X1, X2), the estimators for the mean µ = (µ1, µ2) and
the covariance matrix V are given by
µˆ =
1
m
m∑
i=1
Xi (B1)
V̂ =
1
m
m∑
i=1
(Xi − µˆ)(Xi − µˆ)T (B2)
where Xi is the i-th statistical realization out of m real-
izations of X.
The central limit theorem states that, assuming m re-
alizations X1, X2, . . . , Xm (m≫ 1) of a random variable
X with unknown density function f , mean µ and variance
σ2 <∞, the sample mean
X¯ =
1
m
m∑
i=1
Xi (B3)
is approximately normal with mean µ and variance σ2/m.
In order to estimate the mean value of a variable Y , that
depends on the square of a variable X for which we have
m realizations, we can use the following result: For m
realizations Xi, for i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, of a normally dis-
tributed variable X , having mean µ and unit variance,
the variable
Y =
m∑
i=1
X2i ∼ χ2 (k, λ) (B4)
is distributed according to the χ2 distribution with k = m
degrees of freedom and λ = mµ2. The mean value and
variance of the chi-squared distribution is given by
E(Y ) = k + λ, (B5)
and
Var(Y ) = 2(k + 2λ). (B6)
7Let us assume to have two estimators sˆ1 and sˆ2, with
variances σ21 and σ
2
2 , for the same quantity s acquired by
different processes. We then compute the optimal linear
combination of the variances by the following formula
σ2opt =
σ21σ
2
2
σ21 + σ
2
2
. (B7)
Appendix C: Variances of the channel parameter
estimators
Let us suppose that Aq,i (Bq,i) are independent vari-
ables each one following the normal distribution qA (qB)
with zero mean, variance VM as described in III A. Ac-
cordingly, Rq,i (Rp,i) are assumed to be independent vari-
ables following the normal distribution of qR (pR), i.e. the
relay output variable.
1. Variance of the transmissivity
For the covariance between modes A and R, we can
write the following estimator
CˆARq =
1
m
m∑
i=1
Aq,iRq,i (C1)
normally distributed as the sample mean of variable Z =
AqRq. We can compute the expectation value by
E(CˆARq ) = E(qAqR) =
√
τA
2
VM = CARq , (C2)
and the variance can be defined as
VCov := Var(CˆARq ) (C3)
with
Var(CˆARq ) =
1
m
Var(qAqR) =
=
1
2m
[
τAVar(q
2
A) + τBVar(qAqA,B)
]
+Var(qAqN ), (C4)
=
1
m
(
τAV
2
M +
τB
2
V 2M + VMVq,N
)
=
1
m
(
τA +
τB
2
)
V 2M
[
1 +
Vq,N(
τA +
τB
2
)
VM
]
,
(C5)
where we have considered the independence of the vari-
ables and the second order moments of the normal dis-
tribution.
Therefore, we can derive the mean and variance for the
estimator of τA. We rewrite the estimator as
τˆAq =
2VCov
V 2M
(
CˆARq√
VCov
)2
. (C6)
Note that the variable
(
CˆARq/
√
VCov
)2
is
χ2−distributed, i.e.,(
CˆARq√
VCov
)2
∼ χ2
[
1,
(
CARq√
VCov
)2]
, (C7)
with expectation value
E
( CˆARq√
VCov
)2 = 1 + ( CARq√
VCov
)2
, (C8)
and variance
Var
( CˆARq√
VCov
)2 = 2[1 + 2( CARq√
VCov
)2]
. (C9)
The expectation value of τˆAq is then given by
E(τˆAq) =
2VCov
V 2M
[
1 +
(
CARq√
VCov
)2]
=
=
2C2ARq
V 2M
+O(1/m) = τA +O(1/m) (C10)
and its variance is
Var(τˆAq) =
4V 2Cov
V 4M
2
[
1 + 2
(
CARq√
VCov
)2]
=
=
16VCovC
2
ARq
V 4M
+O(1/m2). (C11)
By replacing from Eq. (C2) and Eq. (C5), we obtain
Var(τˆAq) =
16
mV 4M
(
τA +
τB
2
)
V 4MτA
2
[
1 +
Vq,N(
τA +
τB
2
)
VM
]
+O(1/m2),
(C12)
=
8τA
m
(
τA +
τB
2
)[
1 +
Vq,N(
τA +
τB
2
)
VM
]
+O(1/m2). (C13)
Clearly, as previously noted in [61], the estimator of the
transmissivity τˆAq is only asymptotically unbiased. In
fact the standard deviation
√
Var(τˆAq) is of order 1/
√
m
while the bias goes as 1/m. As we consider m > 105 in
our analysis, the value of the bias become rapidly negli-
gible as m≫ 1, and the use of estimators τˆA and τˆB very
accurate.
2. Variance of the excess noise
Also in our estimation procedure for the MDI proto-
col, in analogy to the theory developed in Ref. [61], the
8variance of the estimator can be obtained replacing the
estimator of τA (τB) with its value. This simplifies the
calculations. Now, we can assume that any uncertainty
in the estimator of the excess noise obtained from broad-
cast results of relay’s measurements on quadrature q
Vˆq,ǫ =
1
m
m∑
i=1
[
Rq,i −
√
τˆBBq,i −
√
τˆAAq,i√
2
]2
− 1, (C14)
comes only from variables Rq,i, Aq,i and Bq,i. We then
have that the expression inside square brackets is nor-
mally distributed with zero mean and variance Vq,N . In
addition to this one also has that the following expression
Y :=
m∑
i=1
(
Rq,i −
(√
τBBq,i −√τAAq,i
)
/
√
2√
Vq,N
)2
∼ χ2(m, 0),
(C15)
is χ2-distributed, and has mean E(Y ) = m and variance
Var(Y ) = 2m. This allows to approximate the sum of
Eq. (C14) with Vq,NY when we assume large values for
m, obtaining the expectation value
E(Vˆq,ǫ) ≈ 1
m
Vq,NE(Y )− 1 = Vq,ǫ (C16)
and the variance
Var(Vˆq,ǫ) ≈ 1
m2
V 2q,NVar(Y ) =
2
m
V 2q,N . (C17)
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